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Abstract
Active re-identification attacks pose a serious threat to privacy-preserving social
graph publication. Active attackers create fake accounts to build structural pat-
terns in social graphs which can be used to re-identify legitimate users on published
anonymised graphs, even without additional background knowledge. So far, this type
of attacks has only been studied in the scenario where the inherently dynamic social
graph is published once. In this paper, we present the first active re-identification
attack in the more realistic scenario where a dynamic social graph is periodically
published. The new attack leverages tempo-structural patterns for strengthening the
adversary. Through a comprehensive set of experiments on real-life and synthetic
dynamic social graphs, we show that our new attack substantially outperforms the
most effective static active attack in the literature by increasing the success proba-
bility of re-identification by more than two times and efficiency by almost 10 times.
Moreover, unlike the static attack, our new attack is able to remain at the same level
of effectiveness and efficiency as the publication process advances. We conduct a
study on the factors that may thwart our new attack, which can help design graph
anonymising methods with a better balance between privacy and utility.
Keywords: privacy-preserving social graph publication, re-identification attack, active
adversary, dynamic social networks
1 Introduction
Social graphs have proven to be a valuable data source for conducting sociological studies,
market analyses, and other forms of complex data analysis. This creates a strong incentive
for the establishment of a mutually beneficial relation between analysts and data owners.
For analysts, it is of paramount importance to have access to abundant, reliable social graph
1
ar
X
iv
:1
91
1.
09
53
4v
1 
 [c
s.S
I] 
 21
 N
ov
 20
19
data in order to conduct their studies. For data owners, making these data available to third
parties opens a number of additional business opportunities, as well as opportunities for
improving their social perception by contributing to the advancement of research. However,
releasing social network data raises serious privacy concerns, due to the sensitive nature of
much of the information implicitly or explicitly contained in social graphs. Consequently,
the data needs to be properly sanitised before publication.
It has been shown that some forms of sanitisation, e.g. removing users’ identities and
personally identifying information from the released data, a process known as pseudonymi-
sation, are insufficient for protecting sensitive information. This is due to the fact that
a majority of users can still be unambiguously re-identified in the pseudonymised graph
by means of simple structural patterns [14, 22, 2, 23]. The re-identification subsequently
facilitates inferring relations between users, group affiliations, etc. A method allowing a
malicious agent, or adversary, to re-identify (a subset of) the users in a sanitised social
graph is called a re-identification attack.
A large number of anonymisation methods have been proposed for publishing sanitised
social graphs that effectively resist re-identification attacks. The largest family of graph
anonymisation methods (e.g. [14, 16, 3, 5, 33, 17, 30, 29, 4, 38, 39, 34, 18, 19]) follows a
common strategy of editing the vertex and/or edge set of the pseudonymised graph in order
to satisfy some formal privacy properties. These privacy properties rely on an adversary
model, which encodes a number of assumptions about the adversary capabilities. In the
context of social graph publication, there are two classes of adversaries. On the one hand,
passive adversaries depend on publicly available information, in case that it can be obtained
from online resources, public records, etc., without interacting with the social network
before publication. On the other hand, active adversaries interact with the network before
the sanitised dataset is released, in order to force the existence of structural patterns.
Then, when the sanistised graph is published, they leverage these patterns for conducting
the re-identification. Active adversaries have been shown to be a serious threat to social
graph publication [2, 20], as they remain plausible even if no public background knowledge
is available. Active attackers have the capability of inserting fake accounts in the social
network, commonly called sybil nodes, and creating connection patterns between these fake
accounts and a set of legitimate users, the victims. After the publication of the sanitised
graph, the attacker uses these unique patterns for re-identifying the victims.
Social networks are inherently dynamic. Moreover, analysts require datasets containing
dynamic social graphs in order to conduct numerous tasks such as community evolution
analysis [6], link prediction [15] and link persistence analysis [25], among others. Despite
the need for properly anonymised dynamic social graphs, the overwhelming majority of
studies on graph anonymisation have focused on the scenario of a social graph being re-
leased only once. The rather small number of studies on dynamic social graph publication
have provided only a partial understanding of the field, as they have exclusively focused on
passive adversary models. Consequently, the manners in which active adversaries can profit
from a dynamic graph publication scenario remain unknown. In this paper, we remedy this
situation by formulating active re-identification attacks in the scenario of dynamic social
graphs. We consider a scenario where the underlying dynamic graph is periodically sampled
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for snapshots, and sanitised versions of these snapshots are published. We model an active
adversary whose knowledge consists in tempo-structural patterns, instead of exclusively
structural patters as those used by the original (static) active adversary. Moreover, in our
model the adversary knowledge is incremental, as it grows every time a new snapshot is
released, and the adversary has the opportunity to adapt along the publication process.
Under the new model, we devise for the first time a dynamic active re-identification attack
on periodically released dynamic social graphs. The new attack is more effective than
the alternative of executing independent static attacks on different snapshots. Further-
more, it is also considerably more efficient than the previous attacks, because it profits
from temporal patterns to accelerate the search procedures in the basis of several of its
components.
Our contributions. The main contributions of this paper are listed in what follows:
• We formulate, for the first time, active re-identification attacks in the scenario of
periodically released dynamic social graphs.
• Based on the new formulation, we present, to the best of our knowledge, the first dy-
namic active re-identification attack on periodically released dynamic social graphs,
which constructs and leverages tempo-structural patterns for re-identification.
• We conduct a comprehensive set of experiments on real-life and synthetic dynamic
social graphs, which demonstrate that the dynamic active attack is more than two
times more effective than the alternative of repeatedly executing the strongest active
attack reported in the literature for the static scenario [20].
• Our experiments also show that, as the number of published snapshots grows, the dy-
namic active attack runs almost 10 times faster than the static active attack from [20].
• We analyse the factors that affect the effectiveness of our new attack. The conclusions
of this study serve as a starting point for the development of anonymisation methods
for the new scenario.
Structure of the paper. We discuss the related work in Sect. 2, focusing in similarities
and differences with respect to our new proposals. Then, we describe the periodical graph
publication scenario, accounting for active adversaries, in Sect. 3; and we introduce the
new dynamic active attack in Sect. 4. Finally, our experimental evaluation is presented in
Sect. 5 and we give our conclusions in Sect. 6.
2 Related Work
Re-identification attacks are a relevant threat for privacy-preserving social graph publica-
tion methods that preserve a mapping between the real users and a set of pseudonymised
nodes in the sanitised release [14, 16, 3, 5, 33, 17, 30, 29, 4, 38, 39, 34, 18, 19].
3
Depending on the manner in which the attacker obtains the knowledge used for re-
identification, these attacks can be divided into two classes: passive and active attacks.
Passive adversaries collect publicly available knowledge, such as public profiles in other
social networks, and searches the sanitised graph for vertices with an exact or similar
profile. For example, Narayanan and Shmatikov [22] used information from Flickr to re-
identify users in a pseudonymised subgraph of Twitter. A considerable number of passive
attacks have been proposed, e.g. [22, 21, 35, 26, 24, 9, 10, 8]. On the other hand, active
adversaries interact with the real network before publication, and force the existence of
the structural patterns that allow re-identification after release. The earliest examples of
active attacks are the walk-based attack and the cut-based attack, introduced by Backstrom
et al. in [2]. Both attacks insert sybil nodes in the network, and create connection patterns
between the sybil nodes that allow their efficient retrieval in the pseudonymised graph. In
both attacks, the connection patterns between sybil nodes and victims are used as unique
fingerprints allowing re-identification once the sybil subgraph is retrieved. Due to the low
resilience of the walk-based and cut-based attacks, a robust active attack was introduced
by Mauw et al. in [20]. The robust active attack introduces noise tolerant sybil subgraph
retrieval and fingerprint mapping, at the cost of larger computational complexity. The
attack proposed in this paper preserves the noise resiliency of the robust active attack,
but puts a larger emphasis on temporal consistency constraints for reducing the search
space. As a result, for every run of the re-identification, our attack is comparable to the
original walk-based attack in terms of efficiency and to the robust active attack in terms
of resilience against modifications in the graph.
Notice that, by itself, the use of connection fingerprints as adversary knowledge does
not make an attack active. The key feature of an active attack is the fact that the adversary
interacts with the network to force the existence of the fingerprints. For example, Zou et
al. [39] describe an attack that uses as fingerprints the distances of the victims to a set of
hubs. This is a passive attack, since hubs exist in the network without intervention of the
attacker.
The attacks discussed so far assume a single release scenario. A smaller number of
works have discussed re-identification in a dynamic scenario. Some works assume an ad-
versary who can exploit the availability of multiple snapshots, although they only give a
coarse overview of the increased adversary capabilities, without giving details on attack
strategies. Examples of these works are [31], which models a passive adversary that knows
the evolution of the degrees of all vertices; and [39], which models another passive adver-
sary that knows the evolution of a a subgraph around the victims. An example of a full
dynamic de-anonymization method is given in [7]. Although they do not model an active
adversary, the fact that the method relies on the existence of a seed graph makes it po-
tentially extensible with an active first stage for seed re-identification, as done for example
in [27, 28]. Our attack differs from the methods above in the fact that it uses an evolving
set of sybil nodes that dynamically interact with the network and adapt to its evolution.
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3 Periodical Graph Publication in the Presence of Ac-
tive Adversaries
In this section we describe the scenario where the owner of a social network periodically
publishes sanitised snapshots of the underlying dynamic social graph, accounting for the
presence of active adversaries. We describe this scenario in the form of an attacker-defender
game between the data owner and the active adversary. We first introduce the basic
notation and terminology, and then give an overview of the entire process and a detailed
description of its components.
3.1 Notation and Terminology
We represent a dynamic social graph as a sequence G = (G1, G2, . . . , Gi, . . .), where each
Gi is a static graph called the i-th snapshot of G. Each snapshot of G has the form
Gi = (Vi, Ei), where Vi is the set of vertices (also called nodes indistinctly throughout the
paper) and Ei ⊆ Vi × Vi is the set of edges.
We will use the notations VG and EG for the vertex and edge sets of a graph G. In this
paper, we assume that graphs are simple and undirected. That is, G contains no edges
of the form (v, v) and, for every pair v, w ∈ VG, (v, w) ∈ EG ⇐⇒ (w, v) ∈ EG. The
neighbourhood of a vertex v in a graph G is the set NG(v) = {w ∈ V | (v, w) ∈ E}, and
its degree is δG(v) = |NG(v)|. For the sake of simplicity, in the previous notations we drop
the subscript when it is clear from the context and simply write N(v), δ(v), etc.
For a subset of nodes S ⊆ VG, we use 〈S〉G to represent the subgraph of G induced by
S, i.e. 〈S〉G = (S,EG ∩ (S × S)). Similarly, the subgraph of G weakly induced by S is
defined as 〈S〉wG = (S ∪ NG(S), EG ∩ (S × (S ∪ NG(S)))). For every graph G and every
S ⊆ VG, 〈S〉G is a subset of 〈S〉wG, as 〈S〉wG additionally contains the neighbourhood of S
and every edge between elements of S and their neighbours. Also notice that 〈S〉wG does
not contain the edges linking pairs of elements of NG(S).
An isomorphism between two graphs G = (V,E) and G′ = (V ′, E ′) is a bijective
function ϕ : V → V ′ such that ∀v,w∈V (v, w) ∈ E ⇐⇒ (ϕ(v), ϕ(w)) ∈ E ′. Additionally, we
denote by ϕ(S) the restriction of ϕ to a vertex subset S ⊆ V , that is ϕ(S) = {ϕ(v) | v ∈ S}.
3.2 Overview
Fig. 1 depicts the process of periodical graph publication in the presence of an active
adversary. We model this process as a game between two players, the data owner and the
adversary. From a practical perspective, it is implausible for the data owner to release a
snapshot of the dynamic graph every time a small amount of changes occurs, hence the
periodical nature of the publication process. The data owner selects a set of time-stamps
T = {t1, t2, . . . , ti, . . .}, t1 < t2 < . . . < ti < . . ., and incrementally publishes the sequence
G? = (G?t1 , G?t2 , . . . , G?ti , . . .)
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Figure 1: Overview of the process of periodical graph publication in the presence of active
adversaries.
of sanitised snapshots of the underlying dynamic social graph. The adversary’s goal is
to re-identify, in a subset T ′ ⊆ T of the releases, a (possibly evolving) set of legitimate
users referred to as the victims. To achieve this goal, the active adversary injects an (also
evolving) set of fake accounts, commonly called sybils, in the graph. The sybil accounts
create connections among themselves, and with the victims. The connection patterns
between each victim and some of the sybil nodes is used as a unique fingerprint for that
victim. The likely unique patterns built by the adversary with the aid of the sybil nodes will
enable her to effectively and efficiently re-identify the victims in the sanitised snapshots.
At every re-identification attempt, the adversary first re-identifies the set of sybil nodes,
and then uses the fingerprints to re-identify the victims.
The data owner and the adversary have different partial views of the dynamic social
graph. On the one hand, the data owner knows the entire set of users, both legitimate
users and sybil accounts, but she cannot distinguish them. The data owner also knows
all relations. On the other hand, the adversary knows the identity of her victims and the
structure of the subgraph weakly induced by the set of sybil nodes, but she does not know
the structure of the rest of the network. In this paper we conduct the analysis from the
perspective of an external observer who can view all of the information. For the sake of
simplicity in our analysis, we will differentiate the sequence
G+ = (G+t1 , G+t2 , . . . , G+ti , . . .),
which represents the view of the network according to the data owner, which is the real
network, i.e. the one containing the nodes representing all users, both legitimate and
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malicious, from the sequence
G = (Gt1 , Gt2 , . . . , Gti , . . .),
which represents the view of the unattacked network, that is the view of the dynamic
subgraph induced in G+ by the nodes representing legitimate users.
In the original formulation of active attacks, a single snapshot of the graph is released,
so all actions executed by the sybil nodes are assumed to occur before the publication. This
is not the case in the scenario of a periodically released dynamic social graph. Here, the
adversary has the opportunity to schedule actions in such a way that the subgraph induced
by the sybil nodes evolves, as well as the set of fingerprints. In turn, that allows her to
use temporal patterns in addition to structural patterns for re-identification. Additionally,
the adversary can target different sets of victims along the publication process and adapt
the induced tempo-structural patters to the evolution of the graph and the additional
knowledge acquired in each re-identification attempt. In the new scenario, the actions
performed by the adversary and the data owner alternate as follows before, during and
after each time-stamp ti ∈ T .
Before ti: The adversary may remain inactive, or she can modify the set of sybil nodes,
as well the set of sybil-to-sybil and sybil-to-victim edges. The result of these actions is the
graph G+ti = (Vti ∪ Sti , Eti ∪E+ti ), where Vti is the current set of legitimate users, Sti is the
current set of sybil nodes, Yti ⊆ Vti is the current set of victims, Eti = EGti ⊆ Vti × Vti is
the set of connections between legitimate users, and E+ti ⊆ (Sti ×Sti)∪ (Sti ×Yti) is the set
of connections created by the sybil accounts. The subgraph 〈Sti〉wG+ti , weakly induced in G
+
ti
by the set of sybil nodes, is the sybil subgraph. We refer to the set of modifications of the
sybil subgraph executed before the adversary has conducted any re-identification attempt
as sybil subgraph creation. If the adversary has conducted a re-identification attempt on
earlier snapshots, we refer to the modifications of the sybil subgraph as sybil subgraph
update.
During ti: The data owner applies an anonymisation method to G
+
ti to obtain the sanitised
version G?ti , which is then released. The anonymisation must preserve the consistency of the
pseudonyms. That is, every user must be labelled with the same pseudonym throughout the
sequence of snapshots where it appears. Consistent annotation is of paramount importance
for a number of analysis tasks such as community evolution analysis [6], link prediction [15],
link persistence analysis [25], among others, that require to track users along the sequence
of releases. The data owner anonymises every snapshot exactly once.
After ti: The adversary adds G
?
ti
to her knowledge. At this point, she can remain inactive,
or she can execute a re-identification attempt on G?ti . The result of a re-identification
attempt is a mapping φti : VG?ti
→ Yti determining the pseudonyms assigned to the victims
by the anonymisation method. Here, the adversary can additionally modify the results of
a previous re-identification attempt conducted on some of the preceding releases.
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3.3 Components of the Process
To discuss in detail the different actions that the data owner or the adversary execute, we
follow the categorisation given in above in terms of the time where each action may occur
for every time-stamp ti. We first discuss sybil subgraph creation and update, which occur
before ti, then graph publication, which occurs at ti, and finally re-identification, which
occurs after ti.
3.3.1 Sybil subgraph creation and update
As we mentioned above, sybil subgraph creation is executed before the adversary has
attempted re-identification for the first time; whereas sybil subgraph update is executed
in the remaining time-steps.
Sybil subgraph creation: In the dynamic scenario, the adversary can build the initial
sybil subgraph along several releases. This allows the creation of tempo-structural pat-
terns, incorporating information about the first snapshot where each sybil node appears,
to facilitate the sybil subgraph retrieval stage during re-identification. As in all active
attacks, the patterns created must ensure that, with high probability, 〈Sti〉wG+ti is unique.
We denote by Fti(y) the fingerprint of a victim y ∈ Yti in terms of Sti . Throughout this
paper we consider that Fti(y) is uniquely determined by the neighbourhood of y in Sti ,
that is Fti(y) = Sti ∩NG+y . We denote by Fti the set of fingerprints of all victims in G+ti .
Sybil subgraph update: In this step, the adversary can modify the set of sybil nodes, by
adding new sybil nodes or replacing existing ones. The latter action helps to make every
individual sybil node’s behaviour appear more normal, which in turn makes it more likely
to succeed in establishing the necessary relations and less likely to be detected by sybil
defences. The adversary can also modify the inter-sybil connections and the fingerprints.
Since sybil subgraph update is executed after at least one re-identification attempt has
been conducted, the adversary can use information from this attempt, such as the level of
uncertainty in the re-identification, to decide the changes to introduce in the sybil subgraph.
Finally, if the number of fingerprints that can be constructed using the new set of sybil
nodes is larger than the previous number of targeted victims, that is 2|Sti |−1 > |Yti−1|, the
adversary can additionally target new victims, either new users that joined the network in
the last inter-release interval, or previously enrolled users that had not been targeted so
far. In the latter case, even if these victims had not been targeted before, the consistency
of the labelling in the sequence of sanitised snapshots entails that a re-identification in the
ti-th snapshot can be traced back to the previous ones.
3.3.2 Graph publication
As we discussed above, at time step ti, the data owner anonymises G
+
ti and publishes
the sanitised version G?ti . From a general point of view, we treat the anonymisation as
a two-step process. The first step is pseudonymisation, which consists in building the
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isomorphism ϕti : VG+ti
→ V ′?ti , with V ′?ti ∩ VG+ti = ∅, that replaces every real identity in G
+
ti
for a pseudonym. The pseudonymised graph is denoted as ϕtiG
+
ti . If i = 1, all pseudonyms
are freshly generated. In the remaining cases, the pseudonyms for previously existing
vertices are kept, and fresh pseudonyms are assigned to new vertices.
Releasing the pseudonymised graph has been proven to be insufficient for preventing re-
identification [22, 14, 32, 2, 20]. Thus, the second step of the anonymisation process consists
in applying a perturbation method Φti : ϕtiG
+
ti → (V ?ti , V ?ti × V ?ti ) to the pseudonymised
graph. Perturbation consists in editing the vertex and/or edge sets of the pseudonymised
graph in such a way that the resulting graph satisfies some privacy guarantee against re-
identification. For the case of active adversaries, the relevant perturbation methods are
the ones based on random vertex/edge flipping and those based on the notions of (k,Γ`)-
(adjacency) anonymity [32, 18, 19, 20]. Finally, the data owner releases the graph G?ti
obtained as the result of applying pseudonymisation on G+ti and perturbation on ϕtiG
+
ti ,
that is G?ti = Φti(ϕtiG
+
ti).
3.3.3 Re-identification
In the new scenario, re-identification is dynamic, as it occurs along several time-steps,
leveraging the increase of the adversary knowledge after the release of every new snapshot.
Considering the applicable techniques, we differentiate the first re-identification attempt,
which can be executed immediately after the publication of G?ti , from the remaining at-
tempts, which we refer to as refinements, and can be executed after the release of every
other G?tj , j > i.
First re-identification attempt: The first re-identification attempt is composed of two
steps: sybil subgraph retrieval and fingerprint matching. From a general point of view, the
procedure consists in the following steps:
1. Sybil subgraph retrieval:
(a) Find in G?ti a set Xti = {X1, X2, . . . , Xp}, Xj ⊆ VG?ti , of candidate sybil sets. For
every X ∈ Xti , the graph 〈X〉wG?ti is a candidate sybil subgraph. Every specific
attack defines the conditions under which a candidate is added to Xti .
(b) Filter out elements of Xti that fail to satisfy temporal consistency constraints
with respect to 〈St1〉wG+t1 , 〈St2〉
w
G+t2
, . . . , 〈Sti−1〉wG+ti−1 . The specific constraints to
enforce depend on the instantiation of the attack strategy.
(c) If Xti = ∅, the attack fails. Otherwise, proceed to fingerprint matching (step 2).
2. Fingerprint matching:
(a) Select one element X ∈ Xti . As in the previous steps, every specific attack
defines how the selection is made.
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(b) Using X and Fti , find a set of candidate mappings YX = {φ1, φ2, . . . , φq}, where
every φj (1 ≤ j ≤ q) has the form φj : VG?ti \ Sti → Yti . Every element of YXti
represents a possible re-identification of the victims in G?ti .
(c) Filter out elements of YXti that fail to satisfy (attack-specific) temporal consis-
tency constraints with respect to Ft1 ,Ft2 , . . . ,Fti−1 .
(d) If YX ′ti = ∅, the attack fails. Otherwise, select one element of YX ′ti and give it as
the result of the re-identification. As in the previous steps, every specific attack
defines how the selection is made.
In an actual instantiation of the attack, steps 1.a-c, as well as steps 2.a-d, are not
necessarily executed in that order, nor independently. As we will show in Sects. 4 and 5,
combining temporal consistency constraints with structural similarity allows for higher
effectiveness and considerable speed-ups in several steps.
Re-identification refinement: As we discussed above, the first re-identification attempt
on G?ti can be executed immediately after the snapshot is published. Then, after the publi-
cation of G?tj , j > i, the re-identification refinement step allows to improve the adversary’s
certainty on the previous re-identification, by executing the following actions:
1. Filter out elements of Xti that fail to satisfy additional temporal consistency con-
straints with respect to 〈Sti〉wG+ti and 〈Stj〉
w
G+tj
.
2. Repeat the fingerprint matching step.
Note that, in a specific attack, the adversary may choose to run the re-identification
on G?ti only once, waiting for the release of several G
?
tj1
, G?tj2 , . . . , G
?
tjr
, and combining all
temporal consistency checks of the first attempt and the refinements in a single execution
of step 1.b described above. However, we keep the main re-identification attempt separable
from the refinements considering that in a real-life attack the actual time elapsed between
G?ti and G
?
tj
can be considerably large, e.g. several months.
4 A Novel Dynamic Active Attack
In this section we present what is, to the best of our knowledge, the first active attack on
periodically released dynamic social graphs. The novelty of our attack lies in its ability
to exploit the dynamic nature of the social graph being periodically published, and the
fact that the publication process occurs incrementally. Our attack benefits from temporal
information in two fundamental ways. Firstly, we define a number of temporal consistency
constraints, and use them in all stages of the re-identification process. In sybil subgraph
retrieval, consistency constraints allow us to obtain considerably small sets of plausible can-
didates, which increases the likelihood of the attacker selecting the correct one. A similar
situation occurs in fingerprint matching. Moreover, the incremental publication process al-
lows the adversary to refine previous re-identifications by applying new consistency checks
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based on later releases. In all cases, temporal consistency constraints additionally make
the re-identification significantly fast, especially when compared with comparably noise-
resilient methods reported in the literature for the static publication scenario. The second
manner in which our attack benefits from the dynamicity of the publication process is
by adapting the set of fingerprints in the interval between consecutive re-identification
attempts in such a way that the level of uncertainty in the previous re-identification is
reduced.
In the remainder of this section, we will describe out new attack in detail. We will first
introduce the notions of temporal consistency. Then, we will describe the manner in which
temporal consistency is exploited for dynamic re-identification. Finally, we will describe
how tempo-structural patterns are created and maintained.
4.1 Temporal consistency constraints
As we discussed in Sect. 3.2, the data owner must assign the same pseudonym to each user
throughout the subsequence of snapshots where it appears, to allow for analysis tasks such
as community evolution analysis [6], link prediction [15], link persistence analysis [25], etc.
Since the data owner cannot distinguish between legitimate users (including victims) and
sybil accounts, she will assign time-persistent pseudonyms to all of them. Additionally,
since the adversary receives all sanitised snapshots, she can determine when a pseudonym
was used for the first time, whether it is still in use, and in case it is not, when it was used
for the last time.
In our attack, the adversary exploits this information in all stages of the re-identification
process. For example, consider the following situation. The set of sybil nodes at time-step
t6 is St6 = {s1, s2, s3, s4}. The adversary inserted s1 and s2 in the interval preceding
the publication of G?t2 . Additionally, she inserted s3 before the publication of G
?
t3
and s4
before the publication of G?t5 . After the release of G
?
t6
, during the sybil subgraph retrieval
phase of the first re-identification attempt, the adversary needs to determine whether a
set X ⊆ VG?t6 , say X = {v1, v2, v3, v4}, is a valid candidate. Looking at the first snapshot
where each of these pseudonyms was used, the adversary observes that v1 and v3 were first
used in G?t2 , so they are feasible matches for s1 and s2, in some order. Likewise, v2 was
first used in G?t5 , so it is a feasible match for s4. However, she observes that v4 was first
used in G?t4 , unlike any element of St6 . From this observation, the adversary knows that
X is not a valid candidate, regardless of how structurally similar 〈X〉wG?t6 and 〈St6〉
w
G+t6
are.
The previous example illustrates how temporal consistency constraints are used for
discarding candidate sybil sets. We now formalise the different types of constraints used in
our attack. To that end, we introduce some new notation. The function α+ : ∪ti∈TVG+ti → T
yields, for every vertex v ∈ ∪ti∈TVG+ti , the order of the first snapshot where v exists, that is
α+(v) = min{{ti ∈ T | v ∈ VG+ti}}.
Analogously, the function α? : ∪ti∈TVG?ti → T yields the order of the first snapshot where
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each pseudonym is used, that is
α?(x) = ti ⇐⇒ ∃v∈V
G+ti
α+(v) = ti ∧ ϕti(v) = x.
Clearly, the adversary knows the values of the function α? for all pseudonyms used by
the data owner. Additionally, she knows the values of α+ for all of her sybil nodes. Thus,
the previous functions allow us to define the notion of first-use-as-sybil consistency, which
is used by the sybil subgraph retrieval method.
Definition 1. Let X ⊆ VG?ti be a set of pseudonyms such that |X| = |Sti | and let φ : Sti →
VG?ti
be a mapping from the set of real sybil nodes to the elements of X. We say that X
and Sti satisfy first-use-as-sybil consistency according to φ, denoted as X 'φ Sti, if and
only if ∀s∈Sti α+(s) = α?(φ(s)).
Note that first-use-as-sybil consistency depends on the order in which the elements of
the candidate set are mapped to the real sybil nodes, which is a requirement of the sybil
subgraph retrieval method.
We define an analogous notion of first use consistency for victims. In this case, the
adversary may or may not know the value of α+. In our attack, we assume that she
does not, and introduce an additional function to represent the temporal information the
adversary must necessarily have about victims. The function β+ : ∪ti∈TYti → T yields,
for every v ∈ ∪ti∈TYti , the order of the snapshot where v was targeted for the first time,
that is
β+(v) = min{{ti ∈ T | v ∈ Yti}}.
The new function allows us to define the notion of first-time-targetted consistency, which
is used in the fingerprint matching method.
Definition 2. Let v ∈ VG?ti be a victim candidate and let y ∈ Yti be a real victim. We
say that v and y satisfy first-time-targetted consistency, denoted as v ' y, if and only if
α?(v) ≤ β+(y).
This temporal consistency notion encodes the rationale that the adversary can ignore
during fingerprint matching those pseudonyms that the data owner used for the first time
after the corresponding victim had been targeted.
Finally, we define the notion of sybil-removal-count consistency, which is used by the
re-identification refinement method to encode the rationale that a sybil set candidate X,
for which no temporal inconsistencies were found during the ti-th snapshot, can be removed
from Xti when the ti+1-th snapshot is released, if the number of sybil nodes removed by the
adversary in the interval between these snapshots does not match the number of elements
of X that cease to exist in G?ti+1 .
Definition 3. We say that a set of pseudonyms X ⊆ VG?ti satisfies sybil-removal-count
consistency with respect to the pair (Sti , Sti+1), which we denote as X ' (Sti , Sti+1), if and
only if |X \ VG?ti+1 | = |Sti \ Sti+1|.
Defs. 1 to 3 play an important role in the new dynamic re-identification methods in-
troduced as part of the new attack, as we will discuss in what follows.
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4.2 Dynamic re-identification
In what follows we describe the methods for sybil subgraph retrieval and fingerprint
matching, which are conducted during the first re-identification attempt, as well as the
re-identification refinement method. In all cases, we pose the emphasis on the manner
in which they use the notions of temporal consistency for maximising effectiveness and
efficiency.
4.2.1 Sybil subgraph retrieval
The sybil subgraph retrieval method is a breath-first search procedure, which shares the
philosophy of analogous methods devised for active attacks on static graphs [2, 20], but
differs from them in the use of temporal consistency constraints for pruning the search
space. To establish the order in which the search space is traversed, our method relies on
the existence of an arbitrary (but fixed) total order ≺ among the set of sybil nodes, which
is enforced by the sybil subgraph creation method and maintained by the sybil subgraph
update method.
Let s1 ≺ s2 ≺ . . . ≺ s|Sti | be the order established on the elements of Sti . The search
procedure first builds a set of cardinality-1 partial candidates
Xti,1 = {{vj1} | vj1 ∈ VG?ti}.
Then, it obtains the pruned set of candidates X ′ti,1 by removing from Xti,1 all elements
{vj1} such that α?(vj1) 6= α+(s1), or
∣∣∣δG?ti (vj1)− δG+ti (s1)∣∣∣ > θ. The first condition verifies
that the first-use-as-sybil consistency property {vj1} 'φ {s1} holds, with φ = {(s1, vj1)}.
The second condition is analogous to the one applied in the noise-tolerant sybil subgraph
retrieval method introduced in [20] as part of the so-called robust active attack. It aims to
exclude from the search tree all candidates X such that ∆(〈X〉wG?ti , 〈Sti〉
w
G+ti
) > θ, where ∆
is a structural dissimilarity function and θ is a tolerance threshold.
After pruning Xti,1, the method builds the set of cardinality-2 partial candidates
Xti,2 = {{vj1 , vj2} | {vj1} ∈ Xti,`, vj2 ∈ VG?ti \ {vj1}}.
Similarly, Xti,2 is pruned by removing all elements {vj1 , vj2} such that {vj1 , vj2} 6'φ {s1, s2},
with φ = {(s1, vj1), (s2, vj2)}, and ∆(〈{vj1 , vj2}〉wG?ti , 〈{s1, s2}〉
w
G+ti
) > θ.
In general, for ` ≤ |Sti|, the method builds the set of partial candidates
Xti,` = {{vj1 , . . . , vj`} | {vj1 . . . , vj`−1} ∈ Xti,`−1,
vj` ∈ VG?ti \ {vj1 , . . . , vj`−1}}
and obtains the pruned candidate set X ′ti,` by removing from Xti,` all elements {vj1 , . . . , vj`}
such that
{vj1 , . . . , vj`} 6'φ {s1, . . . , s`},
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with φ = {(s1, vj1), . . . , (s`, vj`)}, and
∆(〈{vj1 , . . . , vj`}〉wG?ti , 〈{s1, . . . , s`}〉
w
G+ti
) > θ.
In our attack, we use the structural dissimilarity measure defined in [20], which makes
∆(〈{vj1 , . . . , vj`}〉wG?ti , 〈{s1, . . . , s`}〉
w
G+ti
) = |D|+
∑`
k=1
∣∣∣δ′G+ti (sk)− δ′G?ti (vjk)
∣∣∣
where δ′
G+ti
(sk) is is the number of neighbours of sk in G
+
ti that are not in {s1, . . . , s`},
δ′G?ti
(vjk) is is the number of neighbours of vjk in G
?
ti
that are not in {vj1 , . . . , vj`}, and
|D| = |{(jk, jk′) | |EG?ti ∩ {(vjk , vjk′ )}|+ |EG+ti ∩ {(sk, sk′)}| = 1}|
is an efficiently computable estimation of the edge-edit distance between 〈{vj1 , . . . , vj`}〉G?ti
and 〈{s1, . . . , s`}〉G+ti .
Finally, the sybil subgraph retrieval method gives as output the pruned set of cardinality-
|Sti | candidates, that is
Xti = X ′ti,|Sti |.
In other words, our method gives as output the set of temporally consistent subsets whose
weakly induced subgraphs in G?ti are structurally similar, within a tolerance threshold θ,
to that of the original set of sybil nodes in G+ti .
4.2.2 Fingerprint matching
After Xti is obtained, a candidate X = {vj1 , vj2 , . . . vj|Sti |} is randomly selected from Xti ,
with probability 1|Xti |
, for conducting the fingerprint matching step. Let vj1 ≺ vj2 ≺ . . . ≺
vj|Sti |
be the order established on the elements of X by the sybil subgraph retrieval method.
Our fingerprint matching method is a depth-first search procedure, which gives as
output a set YX = {φ1, φ2, . . . , φq}, where every φ ∈ YX has the form φ : Yti → NG?ti (X).
Every element of YX maximises the pairwise similarities between the original fingerprints
of the victims and the fingerprints, with respect to X, of the corresponding pseudonymised
vertices.
The method first finds all equally best matches between the (real) fingerprint Fj of a
victim yj ∈ Yti and that of a temporally consistent vertex u ∈ NG?ti (X) with respect to X,
that is F ?u = NG?ti
(u) ∩ X. Then, for every such match, it recursively applies the search
procedure to match the remaining real victims to other temporally consistent candidate vic-
tims. For every victim yj and every candidate match u, the similarity function sim(F
?
u , Fj)
integrates the verification of the temporal consistency and the structural fingerprint, and
is computed as
sim(F ?u , Fj) =

simc(F
?
u , Fj) if u ' yj
and simc(F
?
u , Fj) ≥ η
0 otherwise.
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where η is a tolerance threshold allowing to ignore insufficiently similar matches and the
function simc(F
?
u , Fj) is defined as
simc(F
?
u , Fj) =
|Sti |∑
k=1
µk(F
?
u , Fj)
with
µk(F
?
u , Fj) =
{
1 if vjk ∈ F ?u and sk ∈ Fj
0 otherwise.
Our method is similar to the one introduced in [20] in the fact that it discards match-
ings whose structural similarity is insufficiently high. Moreover, temporal consistency con-
straints allow our method to considerably reduce the number of final candidate mappings.
4.2.3 Re-identification refinement
After the ti+1-th snapshot is released, the adversary obtains additional information that
can improve the re-identification at the ti-th snapshot. In specific, the adversary learns
the set VG?ti
\ VG?ti+1 of pseudonyms corresponding to users that ceased to be members
of the social network in the interval between the ti-th and the ti+1-th snapshots. If the
adversary removed some sybil nodes sj1 , sj2 , . . . , sjr in this interval, then she knows
that {ϕti(sj1), ϕti(sj2), . . . , ϕti(sjr)} ⊆ VG?ti \ VG?ti+1 . This information allows the adversary
to refine the set Xti obtained in the first re-identification attempt on G?ti . Certainly, a
candidate X such that |X \ VG?ti+1 | 6= |Sti \ Sti+1 | is not a valid match for Sti .
Thus, after the publication ofG?ti+1 , the adversary refines Xti by removing the candidates
that violate the sybil-removal-count consistency notion, that is
X ′ti = Xti \
{
X | X 6' (Sti , Sti+1)
}
,
and re-runs the fingerprint matching step with X ′ti .
4.3 Sybil Subgraph Creation and Update
Here we describe how the necessary tempo-structural patterns for dynamic re-identification
are created and maintained. Both the sybil subgraph creation and the sybil subgraph
update stages contribute to this task. Additionally, the sybil subgraph update addresses
other aspects of the dynamic behaviour of the new attack, e.g. targeting new victims.
4.3.1 Sybil subgraph creation
In the dynamic attack, the initial sybil graph is not necessarily created before the first
snapshot is released. Let G?ti be the first snapshot where the adversary conducts a re-
identification attempt. Then, the sybil sugbraph creation is executed during the entire time
window preceding ti. The adversary initially inserts a small number of sybil nodes, no more
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than
⌊
log2
(
|VG+ti |
)⌋
. This makes the sybil subgraph very unlikely to be detected by sybil
defences [37, 36, 2, 19, 20], while allowing to create unique fingerprints for a reasonably
large number of potential initial victims. Spreading sybil injection over several snapshots
helps create temporal patterns that reduce the search space during sybil subgraph retrieval.
As sybil nodes are inserted, they are connected to other sybil nodes and to some of the
victims. Inter-sybil edges are created in a manner that has been shown in [2] to make the
sybil subgraph unique with high probability, which helps in accelerating the breath-first
search procedure in the basis of sybil subgraph retrieval. First, an arbitrary (but fixed)
order is established among the sybil nodes. In our case, we simply take the order in which
the sybils are created. Let s1 ≺ s2 ≺ . . . ≺ s|Sti | represent the order established among
the sybils. Then, the edges (s1, s2), (s2, s3), . . . , (s|Sti |−1, s|Sti |) are added to force the
existence of the path s1s2 . . . s|Sti |. Additionally, every other edge (sj, sk), |j − k| ≥ 2, is
added with probability 0.5. The initial fingerprints of the elements of Yti are randomly
generated by connecting each victim to each sybil node with probability 0.5, checking that
all fingerprints are unique.
4.3.2 Sybil subgraph update
Let G?ti−1 and G
?
ti
be two consecutive releases occurring after the first snapshot where the
adversary conducted a re-identification attempt (G?ti−1 itself may have been this snapshot).
In the interval between G?ti−1 and G
?
ti
, the adversary updates the sybil subgraph by adding
and/or removing sybil nodes and inter-sybil edges, updating the fingerprints of (a subset of)
the victims, and possibly targeting new victims. The changes made in the sybil subgraph
aim to improve the sybil subgraph retrieval and fingerprint matching steps in future re-
identification attempts. We describe each of these modifications in detail in what follows.
Adding and replacing sybil nodes
In our attack, the adversary is conservative regarding the number of sybil nodes, balancing
the capacity to target more victims with the need to keep the likelihood of being detected by
sybil defences sufficiently low. Thus, the number of sybil nodes is increased as the number
of nodes in the graph grows, but keeping |Sti | ≤
⌊
log2
(
|VG?ti−1 |
)⌋
. If the graph growth
rate between releases is small, this strategy translates into not increasing the number of
sybils during many consecutive releases. However, this does not mean that new sybil nodes
are not created, since the attack additionally selects a (small) random number of existing
sybil nodes and replaces them for fresh sybil nodes. The purpose of these replacements is
twofold. First, they allow to keep the activity level of each individual sybil node sufficiently
low, and thus make it less distinguishable from legitimate nodes. Secondly, the frequent
modification of the set of sybils helps reduce the search space for sybil subgraph retrieval, by
increasing the number of potential candidates violating the first-use-as-sybil consistency
constraint, and enables the re-identification refinement process to detect more sybil set
candidates violating the sybil-removal-count consistency constraint.
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We now discuss the changes that the adversary does in the set of inter-sybil edges to
handle sybil node addition and replacement. Let Sti−1 = {s1, s2, . . . , s|Sti−1 |} be the set
of sybil nodes present in G+ti−1 , and let s1 ≺ s2 ≺ . . . ≺ s|Sti−1 | be the order established
among them. We first consider the case of sybil node addition, where no existing sybil
node is replaced. Let S ′ = {s′1, s′2, . . . , sq} be the set of new sybil nodes that will be
added to G+ti , and let s
′
1 ≺ s′2 ≺ . . . ≺ sq be the order established on them. A structure
analogous to that of the previous sybil subgraph is enforced by adding to G+ti the edges
(s|Sti−1 |, s
′
1), (s
′
1, s
′
2), . . . , (s
′
q−1, s
′
q), which results in extending the path s1s2 . . . s|Sti−1 | into
s1s2 . . . s|Sti−1 |s
′
1s
′
2 . . . sq. Additionally, the adversary adds to G
+
ti every node (x, y), x ∈ S ′,
y ∈ (Sti−1 ∪ S ′) \NG+ti (x), with probability 0.5.
Now, we describe the modifications made by the adversary for replacing a sybil node
sj ∈ Sti−1 for a new sybil node s (s /∈ S ′). In this case, the adversary adds to G+ti
the edges (sj−1, s) and (s, sj+1), where sj−1 and sj+1 are the sybil nodes immediately
preceding and succeeding sj according to ≺. The order ≺ is updated accordingly to make
s1 ≺ s2 ≺ . . . ≺ sj−1 ≺ s ≺ sj+1 ≺ . . . ≺ s|Si−1|. These modifications ensure that the path
s1s2 . . . s|Sti−1 | guaranteed to exist in G
+
ti−1 is replaced in G
+
ti for s1s2 . . . sj−1ssj+1 . . . s|Si−1|.
Additionally the new sybil node s is connected to every other sybil node with probability
0.5. In our attack, every sybil node removal is part of a replacement, so the number of
sybil nodes never decreases.
Updating fingerprints of existing victims
After replacing a sybil node s ∈ Sti−1 for a new sybil node s′ ∈ Sti\Sti−1 , the adversary adds
to G+ti the edge (s
′, y) for every y ∈ Yti−1 ∩NG+ti−1 (s), to guarantee that the replacement of
s for s′ does not render any pair of fingerprints identical in G+ti .
Additionally, if new sybil nodes were added, the fingerprints of all previously targeted
victims in Yti−1 are modified by creating edges linking them to a subset of the new sybil
nodes. For each new sybil node s ∈ Sti \ Sti−1 and every victim y ∈ Yti−1 , the edge (s, y) is
added with probability 0.5.
Finally, if the adversary has conducted a re-identification attempt on G?ti−1 , she makes
additional changes in the set Fti of fingerprints in G+ti based on the outcomes of the re-
identification, specifically on the level of uncertainty suffered because of Fti−1 . To that
end, she selects a subset Y ′ti−1 of victims whose fingerprints were the least useful during the
re-identification attempt, in the sense that they were the most likely to lead to a larger
number of equally likely options after fingerprint mapping. The adversary modifies the
fingerprint of every y ∈ Y ′ti−1 by randomly flipping one edge of the form (y, s), s ∈ Sti−1 ,
checking that the new fingerprint does not coincide with a previously existing fingerprint.
The set Y ′ti−1 is obtained as follows. For every victim yj ∈ Yti−1 , let pj : Rj → [0, 1] be
a probability distribution where
Rj =
{
v ∈ VG?ti−1 | ∃X∈Xti−1∃φ∈YX φ(v) = yj
}
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is the set of vertices mapped to yj according to some X ∈ Xti−1 and the corresponding YX .
That is, for every element v ∈ Rj, pj(v) represents the probability that v has been mapped
to yj in the previous re-identification attempt according to some sybil subgraph candidate
and some of the resulting fingerprint matchings, and is defined as
pj(v) =
∑
X∈Xti−1
∑
φ∈YX τj(φ,v)
|YX |
|Xti−1|
where
τj(φ, v) =
{
1 if v ∈ dom(φ) and φ(v) = yj
0 otherwise.
Finally, the set Y ′ti−1 is obtained by making
Y ′ti−1 = arg max
yj∈Yti−1
{H(pj)},
where H(pj) is the entropy of the distribution pj, that is
H(pj) = −
∑
v∈Rj
pj(v) log pj(v).
If the maximum entropy value is reached for more than one victim, all of their fingerprints
are modified. We chose to use entropy for obtaining Y ′ti−1 because it is a well established
quantifier of uncertainty.
Targeting new victims
After the fingerprints of existing victims have been updated, the final step of sybil subgraph
update consists in targeting new victims. To that end, the adversary chooses a set of
vertices y1, y2, . . . , yr ∈ Vti \Yti−1 , with 0 ≤ r ≤ min
{
|VG?ti−1 | − |Yti−1|, 2
|Sti−1 | − |Yti−1| − 1
}
and adds them to Yti . The new victims can either be fresh vertices, that is vertices that
first appear in G+ti , or previously untargeted ones. The fingerprints of the new victims are
created in the same manner as those of the initial victims. That is, for every yj, 1 ≤ j ≤ r,
the vertex (yj, s), s ∈ Sti , is added to G+ti with probability 0.5, checking that the newly
generated fingerprint is different from those of all previously targeted victims.
5 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we experimentally evaluate our new dynamic active attack. Our evaluation
has three goals. First, we show that our attack outperforms Mauw et al.’s static robust ac-
tive attack [20] in terms of both effectiveness and efficiency. For simplicity, throughout this
section we will use the acronym D-AA for our attack and S-RAA for the static robust active
attack. Secondly, we determine the factors that affect the performance of our new attack,
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and evaluate their impact. From this analysis, we derive a number of recommendations
allowing data owners to balance privacy preservation and utility in random perturbation
methods for periodical social graph publication. Due to the scarcity of real-life temporally
labelled social graphs, we run the aforementioned experiments on synthetic dynamic social
graphs. We developed a synthesiser that can be flexibly configured to generate synthetic
dynamic social graphs with specific properties, e.g. the initial number of nodes and the
growth rate. Using this synthesiser, we run each instance of our experiments in a collec-
tion of 100 synthetic datasets, which allows to mitigate the impact of random components
of our attack and the synthesiser itself. To conclude, we replicate some of the previous
experiments on a real-life dataset, to show that some of the findings obtained on synthetic
data remain valid in practical scenarios.
5.1 Experimental Setting
We implemented an evaluation tool based on the model described in Sect. 3. A dynamic
social graph simulator loads a real-life dataset, or uses the synthesiser, to generate the se-
quence G = (Gt1 , Gt2 , . . . , Gti , . . .) containing only legitimate users. Each snapshot is then
processed by a second module that simulates sybil subgraph creation or update. The out-
put, which is the data owner’s view of the social graph, is processed by graph perturbation
module. In this module, we implement a simple perturbation method consisting in the
addition of cumulative noise. Finally, a fourth module simulates the re-identification on
the perturbed graph and computes the success probability of the attack. Sybil subgraph
creation and update, as well as re-identification, are discussed in detail in Sect. 4. We
describe in what follows the implementation of the remaining modules.
5.1.1 Dynamic social graph simulator
Our simulator allows us to conduct experiments on temporally annotated real-life datasets,
as well as synthetic datasets. In the first case, the simulator extracts from the dataset
the graph snapshots by using a specific handler. The simulator is parameterised with
a sequence of the time-stamps indicating when each snapshot should be taken. Every
snapshot is built by taking all vertices and edges created at a moment earlier or identical
to the corresponding time-stamp and still not eliminated.
As we mentioned, we include in our simulator a synthesiser for generating periodically
released dynamic social graphs, which is based on the Baraba´si-Albert (BA) generative
graph model [1]. We use BA because it preserves the properties of real social graphs, namely
power-law degree distribution [1], shrinking diameter [13], and preferential attachment.
The BA model generates scale-free networks by iteratively adding vertices and creating
connections for the newly added vertices using a preferential attachment scheme. This
means that the newly added vertices are more likely to be connected to previously existing
nodes with larger degrees. The BA model has two parameters: the number of nodes n0 of
a (small) seed graph, and the initial degree Me (Me ≤ n0) of every newly added node. The
initial seed graph can be any graph. In our case we use a complete graph Kn0 . Every time a
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new node v is added to the current version G of the BA graph, Me edges are added between
v and randomly selected vertices in VG. The probability of selecting a vertex w ∈ VG for
creating the new edge (v, w) is δG(w)∑
x∈VG δG(x)
, as prescribed by preferential attachment.
To generate the graph sequence, the synthesiser takes four parameters as input:
• The parameter n0 of the BA model.
• The parameter Me of the BA model.
• The number of vertices of the first snapshot nv.
• The growth rate r∆, defined as the proportion of new edges compared to the previous
number.
The parameters nv and r∆ determine when snapshots are taken. The first snapshot is
taken when the number of vertices of the graph generated by the BA model reaches nv,
and every other snapshot is taken when the ratio between the number of new edges and
that of the previous snapshot reaches r∆.
5.1.2 Graph perturbation via cumulative noise addition
To the best of our knowledge, all existing anonymisation methods against active attacks
based on formal privacy properties [18, 19] assume a single release scenario, and are thus
insufficient for handling multiple releases. Proposing formal privacy properties that take
into account the specificities of the multiple release scenario is part of the future work.
In our experiments, we adapted the other known family of perturbation methods, random
noise addition, to the multiple release scenario.
To account for the incrementality of the publication process, the noise is added in a
cumulative manner. That is, when releasing G?ti , the noise incrementally added on G
?
t1
, G?t2 ,
. . . , G?ti−1 is re-applied on the pseudonymised graph ϕtiG
+
ti to obtain an intermediate noisy
graph G˜?ti , and then fresh noise is added on G˜
?
ti
to obtain the graph G?ti that is released.
In re-applying the old noise, all noisy edges incident in a vertex v ∈ VG?ti−1 \ VϕtiG+ti ,
removed after the release of G?ti−1 , are forgotten. The fresh noise addition consists in
randomly flipping a number of edges of G˜?ti . For every flip, a pair (v, w) ∈ VG˜?ti × VG˜?ti is
uniformly selected and, if (v, w) ∈ EG˜?ti , the edge is removed, otherwise it is added. The
cumulative noise addition method has one parameter: the amount of fresh noise to add in
each snapshot, called noise ratio and denoted Ωnoise . It is computed with respect to |EG˜?ti |,
the number of edges of the pseudonymised graph after restoring the accumulated noise.
5.1.3 Success probability
As in previous works on active attacks for the single release scenario [18, 19, 20], we evaluate
the adversary’s success in terms of the probability that she correctly re-identifies all victims,
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Figure 2: Effectiveness comparison between S-RAA and D-AA.
which in our scenario is computed by the following formula for the ti-th snapshot:
Pr(ti)succ =

∑
X∈Xti
p
(ti)
X
|Xti |
if Xti 6= ∅
0 otherwise
where
p
(ti)
X =
{ 1
|YX | if ∃φ∈YX φ−1 = ϕti |Yti
0 otherwise
and, as discussed in Sect. 3.3, ϕti is the isomorphism applied on G
+
ti to obtain the pseudo-
nymised graph ϕtiG
+
ti . For every snapshot G
?
ti
, we compute success probability after the
re-identification refinement is executed.
5.2 Results and Discussion
We begin our discussion with the comparison of D-AA and S-RAA. Then, we proceed to
study the factors that affect the effectiveness of our attack, and characterise their influence.
Finally, we use the real-life dataset Petster [12] to illustrate the effectiveness of our attack
in practice. For the first two sets of results, we use synthetic dynamic graphs generated by
our synthesiser. Table 1 summarises the different configurations used for the generation.
Furthermore, before each release, we select at least 1 and maximum 5 random legitimate
vertices as new victims. For each parameter combination, we generated 100 synthetic
dynamic graphs, and the results shown are the averages over each subcollection.
5.2.1 Comparing D-AA and S-RAA
The goal of this comparison is to show that our dynamic active attack outperforms the
original attack in both effectiveness and efficiency. We use six settings for the dynamic
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Sect. n0 Me nv r∆ Ωnoise(%)
5.2.1 30 5, 10 200, 400,800 5% 0.5
5.2.2 30 5, 10 2000, 4000, 8000 5% 0.5, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0
Table 1: Combinations of parameters for the simulator.
graph synthesiser. For each value of Me (5 and 10), we set the initial number of vertices
nv at 200, 400 and 800. In all our experiments, sybil subgraph creation spans the first
and second snapshots, and the re-identification is executed for the first time on the second
snapshot.
Effectiveness comparison. In Fig. 2 we show the success probabilities of the two attacks
on graphs with different initial sizes and amounts of changes between consecutive releases
(determined by Me with r∆ fixed as 5%).
We have three major observations from the results. First, we can see that D-AA
significantly outperforms S-RAA in terms of success probability. The improvement becomes
larger when smaller numbers of changes occur between releases. D-AA outperforms S-RAA
by at least twice, even up to three times for the first few snapshots. When graphs grow
slowly (Me = 5), our attack always displays an average success probability larger than 0.5
which S-RAA never reaches. Second, the success probability of the original S-RAA has a
general trend to drop along with time, while D-AA displays a large increase from the first
to the second snapshot, and then remains stable or degrades very slowly. This is the result
of the reduced uncertainty enabled by the temporal consistency constraints. The frequent
modification of the set of sybil nodes allows our attack to offset the noises accumulated
over time and maintain an acceptable success probability even at the later releases. When
Me is set to 10, the success probability remains above 0.5 until the sixth snapshot, even
though noise grows faster in this case. Third, S-RAA is more likely to be influenced by
the randomness of graph structures and noise, as shown by the large fluctuations of the
success probability, while our D-AA displays smaller variance and smoother curves.
Efficiency comparison. Fig. 3 shows the average amount of time consumed by S-RAA
and D-AA in different scenarios. We can see that D-AA takes an almost constant amount
of time at all snapshots, whereas the time consumption of S-RAA grows considerably
along time. This clearly shows that the use of temporal information in dynamic social
graphs helps D-AA to effectively avoid the computation overhead. We highlight the fact
that D-AA runs at least 10 times faster in almost all cases, especially in late snapshots.
An interesting observation is that the running time of S-RAA decreases when Me = 10
and the size of the initial graph is 800. Rather than an improvement, this is in fact the
consequence of the repeated failure of the sybil subgraph retrieval algorithm to find any
candidates. This problem is in turn caused by the small tolerance threshold required by
S-RAA to complete runs in reasonable time.
22
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18
snapshot
0
10
20
30
40
50
tim
e 
(s
)
Me = 5, nv = 200
D-RAA S-RAA
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18
snapshot
0
10
20
30
40
50
tim
e 
(s
)
Me = 5, nv = 400
D-RAA S-RAA
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18
snapshot
0
10
20
30
40
50
tim
e 
(s
)
Me = 5, nv = 800
D-RAA S-RAA
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18
snapshot
0
10
20
30
40
50
tim
e 
(s
)
Me = 10, nv = 200
D-RAA S-RAA
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18
snapshot
0
10
20
30
40
50
tim
e 
(s
)
Me = 10, nv = 400
D-RAA S-RAA
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18
snapshot
0
10
20
30
40
50
tim
e 
(s
)
Me = 10, nv = 800
D-RAA S-RAA
Figure 3: Efficiency comparison between S-RAA and D-AA.
5.2.2 Factors influencing our attack
We intend this analysis to serve as a guide for customising the settings of privacy-preserving
publication methods for dynamic social graphs, in particular for determining the amount
of perturbation needed to balance the privacy requirements and the utility of published
graphs. Since our attack is considerably efficient, we will use for this evaluation dynamic
graphs featuring 2000, 4000 and 8000 initial vertices. In addition, we set large tolerance
thresholds for structural dissimilarity in the sybil subgraph retrieval method, which in-
creases the probability that it finds ϕti(Sti) as a candidate. In our experiment, we set the
threshold θti used at the i-th snapshot to θti = min(1500, 16+250×(i−2)2). Three factors
may possibly impact the effectiveness of re-identification attacks on dynamic graphs: the
amount of noise, the size of graphs and the speed of growth between two releases. As a
result, we analyse three parameters which determine these three factors in our simulator:
Ωnoise , Me and nv. The number of vertices in the initial snapshots nv determines the scale
of the released graphs, while the parameter Me of the BA model controls the number of
new nodes and edges added before the next release. The noise ratio Ωnoise determines the
amount of noise.
Effectiveness. Fig. 4 shows the success probability of our attack when different noise
ratios are applied on dynamic graphs with different initial sizes and growth speeds. First,
we can see that the success probability decreases when more noise is applied. This is
natural as more perturbation makes it more difficult to find the correct sybil sugraph,
either because the sybil graph has been too perturbed to be found as a candidate or because
edge perturbation generates more subgraphs similar to the original sybil subgraph. When
Me = 5 and the noise ratio is set to 0.5%, success probability always remains above 0.5. For
this value of Me, even with Ωnoise at 2.0%, the attack still displays success probability above
0.5 in the first three snapshots. Second, the rate at which success probability decreases
slows down as we increase the value of the noise ratio. The largest drop occurs when
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Figure 4: Factors influencing the success probability.
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Figure 5: Factors influencing the utility of released graphs.
we increase Ωnoise from 0.5 to 1.0. This suggests that keeping increasing the level of
perturbation may not necessarily guarantee a better privacy protection, but just damage
the utility of the released graphs. Third, the sequences of success probability values show a
very small dependence on the initial size of the graphs, with other parameters fixed. Last,
the success probability decreases when dynamic graphs grow faster. From the figure, we
can see that the probability reduces by about 10% when we increase the value of Me from
5 to 10.
Summing up, we observe that the risk of re-identification decreases when more pertur-
bation is applied and when the graphs grow faster, whereas the initial size of the graphs
has a relative small impact on this risk.
Utility. We evaluate the utility of released graphs in terms of three measures: the per-
centage of edge editions, the variation of the average local clustering coefficient, and the
KL-divergence of degree distributions. The first measure quantifies the percentage of edge
flips with respect to the total number of edges. In fact, it quantifies the amount of noise
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accumulated so far. For the ti-snapshot, the percentage of edge editions is computed as
1
|EG+ti |
|{(v, v′) ∈ EG+ti | (ϕ(v), ϕ(v
′)) 6∈ G?ti} ∪ {(v, v′) ∈ EG?ti | (ϕ
−1(v), ϕ−1(v′)) 6∈ G+ti}| .
The local clustering coefficient (LCC) of a vertex measures the proportion of pairs of
mutual neighbours of the vertex that are connected by an edge. We calculate the average
to the LCCs of all vertices and take the proportion between the differences of the value of
the original graph and that of the anonymised graph as, that is
|avgLcc(G+ti)− avgLcc(G?ti) |
avgLcc(G+ti)
.
where avgLcc(G) is the average local clustering coefficient of graph G. Our last measure
uses the KL-divergence [11] as an indicator of the difference between the degree distribution
of the original graph and that of the perturbed graph.
As all the three measures present almost identical patterns for different values of nv, we
only show the results for nv = 8000. We have two major observations. First, as expected,
the values of all three measures increase as the noise accumulates over time, indicating
that the utility of released graphs deteriorates. Even with Ωnoise set to just 1.0%, at the
tenth snapshot we can have up to 10% of edges flipped and changes in edge density around
15%. At this point, we can say that the utility of released graphs has already been greatly
damaged. Second, when dynamic graphs grow faster, the impact of noise becomes smaller,
as more legitimate edges offset the impact of noisy edges.
Together with the finding that larger growth speed results in smaller success probability,
we can conclude that the social networks that grow fast among releases display a better
balance between re-identification risk and the utility of the released graphs.
5.2.3 Results on a real-life dynamic social graph
We make use of a publicly available graph collected from Petster, a website for pet owners to
communicate [12], to validate to what extent the results reported in the previous subsection
remain valid in a more realistic domain. The Petster dataset is an undirected graph whose
vertices represent the pet owners. The vertices are labelled by their joining date, which
span from January 2004 to December 2012. The graph is incremental, which means no
vertices are removed. It contains 1898 vertices and 16, 750 edges. We take a snapshot every
six months.
We present in Fig. 6(a) the success probability of our D-AA attack on the Petster
dataset when the noise ratio is set to 0.5%, 1.0% and 1.5%, respectively. Compared to the
success probabilities discussed above on simulated graphs, the curves have different shapes
and more fluctuations. This is because, instead of a fixed growth speed (determined by r∆
and Me in our simulator), the real-life graph grows at different speeds in different periods,
as shown in Fig. 6(b). We can see that the number of new vertices varies before each
release. After the first few years of steady growth, Petster gradually lost its popularity,
25
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
snapshot
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
su
cc
es
s 
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
noise = 0.5%
noise = 1.0%
noise = 1.5%
(a) Re-identification risk on Petster.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
snapshot
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
#n
ew
 u
se
rs
(b) Numbers of new vertices added be-
fore release.
Figure 6: Evaluation on Petster.
especially with few new vertices added in the last three years. By cross-checking the two
figures, we can see that the success probability changes with the amount of growth before
the corresponding release. It first increases steadily due to the steady growth of the graph
until the fifth snapshot, which suddenly has the largest number of new vertices. Then when
the growth slows down, the success probability also recovers; and when the growth stops
(e.g., from the 12 snapshot), it starts increasing again, even though the noise continues
to accumulate. These observations validate our findings on synthetic graphs, that is, the
speed of growth is the dominating factor that affects the re-identification risk.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented the first dynamic active re-identification attack on pe-
riodically released social graphs. Unlike preceding attacks, the new attack exploits the
inherent dynamic nature of social graphs by leveraging tempo-structural patterns for re-
identification. Compared to existing (static) active attacks, our new dynamic attack sig-
nificantly improves success probability, by more than two times, and efficiency, by almost
10 times. Through comprehensive experimental evaluation on synthetic data, we analysed
the factors influencing the success probability of our attack, namely the growth rate of
the graph and the amount of noise injected. These findings can subsequently be used
to develop graph anonymisation methods that better balance privacy protection and the
utility of the released graphs. For instance, for a given noise level, the decision to publish
a new snapshot should be determined by taking into account the number of changes that
have occurred from the last release. Similarly, if the time for the next release is given,
the amount of noise should be customised according to the number of changes that have
occurred. Additionally, we evaluated our attack on Petster, a real-life dataset. This evalu-
ation showed that some of the findings obtained on synthetic data remain valid in practical
scenarios.
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